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To date, blind quantum computing demonstrations require clients to have weak quantum devices.
Here we implement a proof-of-principle experiment for completely classical clients. Via classically
interacting with two quantum servers that share entanglement, the client accomplishes the task
of having the number 15 factorized by servers who are denied information about the computation
itself. This concealment is accompanied by a verification protocol that tests servers’ honesty and
correctness. Our demonstration shows the feasibility of completely classical clients and thus is a key
milestone towards secure cloud quantum computing.
Whereas quantum computers could exponentially out-
perform classical computers for certain computational
tasks, inaccessibility due to implementation complexity
would hinder widespread adoption of quantum comput-
ing. Thus, quantum computation is increasingly being
performed ‘in the cloud’, such as IBM’s 5-qubit quantum
cloud service [1]. In this approach, quantum comput-
ing is outsourced from a client with classical hardware
to a server who possesses expensive quantum hardware.
Considering the types of applications to which quantum
computing is likely to be applied, imformation security is
important as clients may wish to keep the computation
perfectly secret from untrusted servers implementing the
quantum computation.
A solution to this issue is offered by blind quantum
computing (BQC) [2], which is a quantum cryptographic
protocol that enables a classical client with limited quan-
tum technology to delegate a computation to the quan-
tum server(s) without leaking any information about her
computation to the server(s). Thus far various BQC pro-
tocols have been proposed [2–15] , and some proof-of-
principle experiments have been performed with photonic
qubits [16–20]. However, all these experimental demon-
strations only support quasi-classical clients. That is, the
clients require the ability to prepare or measure single-
qubit states, but wide use of quantum computing on the
cloud would be much more attractive if clients did not
require the ability to perform quantum tasks. Although
using only classical communication between a classical
client and a single quantum server may be infeasible for
secure BQC [21], classical communication between a clas-
sical client and multi-quantum servers can work [14].
Besides security, verifiability is another important con-
cern for BQC, i.e. the ability of a client to test whether or
not the servers perform the task correctly and honestly.
As the complexity of quantum many-body systems scales
up, verifiability becomes a major experimental challenge,
not only in BQC, but also in quantum chemistry [22],
quantum simulation [23], BosonSampling [24], and other
quantum algorithms. Thus, a verification protocol for
BQC is significant not only as a cryptographic proto-
col but also for exploring the relation between quantum
physics and computer science.
Here we demonstrate a proof-of-principle implemen-
tation of BQC for completely classical clients. In our
experiment, we realize Shor’s algorithm [25] for factoriz-
ing N = 15 via the framework of verifiable BQC based
on the Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani (RUV) protocol
[14]. The scheme employs quantum gate teleportation for
computation and combines the rigidity of Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) tests [14] and stabilizer tests for
verification, thereby providing a method for a client to
control quantum servers classically.
Suppose we are given two quantum servers, Alice and
Bob, that share Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) states
but cannot communicate with each other (enforced e.g.
through space-like separation of the devices). The client
Charlie, holding a completely classical device, wants to
delegate quantum computing to the remote servers with-
out leaking any imformation about the computation to
servers. He can decompose the circuit into two parts,
Computation-A and Computation-B, and send these two
tasks to Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice and Bob op-
erate on their respective halves of the shared EPR states
according to Charlie’s commands and return to Charlie
the measurement results. As Alice and Bob cannot com-
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FIG. 1. (color online). Quantum circuit for factorizing
N = 15 using Shor’s algorithm. (a) Quantum circuit for
N = 15 and a = 11 [26]. The modular exponential function
is implemented by two CNOT gates, and the QFT is imple-
mented by Hadamard rotations and two-qubit conditional-
phase gates. (b) The simplified version of the circuit in (a),
omitting the qubits and operations marked by dotted lines in
(a). (c) The scheme of cloud quantum computing for factor-
izing N = 15. Each measurement is in the Z basis.
municate with each other, they cannot learn the results
from each other, so this delegated computation is ‘blind’,
meaning that each server learns nothing more about the
computation than its length [14].
For the task of factorizing N using Shor’s algorithm, if
we pick a random number a that is co-prime to N , Shor’s
algorithm can yield the minimum integer r that satisfies
ar mod N = 1. From this period r, the prime factors of
N are given by the greatest common divisor (GCD) of
ar/2 ± 1 and N , which is solved classically. The quan-
tum circuit for N = 15 and a = 11 is shown in Fig. 1(a)
[26]. In fact, The inverse quantum Fourier transforma-
tion (QFT) is unnecessary for any order-2l circuit [27].
Moreover, two qubits |0〉2 and |1〉4 evolve trivially dur-
ing the computation and thus can be omitted. This fact
allows us to simplify the circuit to Fig. 1(b) by omitting
obsolete qubits and operations marked by dotted lines in
the circuit in Fig. 1(a).
To delegate the circuit in Fig. 1(b) to two remote quan-
tum servers, Charlie decomposes it into two parts (see
Fig. 1(c)) and sends the tasks to Alice and Bob, respec-
tively. Each observable of Alice (Bob) has eigenvalues
±1 such that each outcome ai(bi) reported to Charlie
takes values of ±1, where i denotes the ith qubit of Al-
ice (Bob). By design, Computation-A performs the first
controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate of the circuit and prepares
the third input state |0〉 for Bob. If Alice implements
Computation-A honestly, Bob’s share of EPR states col-
lapses into |Ψ〉|β〉, where |Ψ〉 is one of the four Bell states,
and |β〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉}, according to Alice’s results. In par-
ticular, when Alice reports a1 = a2 = a3 = 1, Bob’s state
collapses into the desired resource state |φ〉 = |Φ+〉|0〉,
where |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), which is equivalent to the
state after the first CNOT gate in the circuit in Fig. 1(b).
Then Bob implements Computation-B to achieve the sec-
ond CNOT gate and measures his 2nd qubit in the Pauli
X basis to output the result of Shor’s algorithm. Bob’s
remaining two qubits contribute nothing to the outcome
and are both measured in the Pauli Z basis as they can
be employed in the validation procedure described below.
When performing such a computation on untrusted
quantum servers, clients also wish to test the hon-
esty of servers: did they implement the computation
as promised? To realize this test, Charlie randomly
switch tasks being implemented by Alice and Bob be-
tween the desired computation and ‘dummy’ protocols.
The dummy protocols are constructed such that Alice
and Bob are unable to distinguish whether they are im-
plementing the proper computation or the dummy, but
such that Charlie is able to detect if the dummy tasks
are being implemented dishonestly. Via repeated appli-
cation of this randomized procedure, Charlie then deter-
mines whether Alice and Bob are being honest. Specif-
ically, Charlie can randomly command the servers (see
Fig. 2(a)) to implement the four sub-protocols below:
1. Computation. As shown in Fig. 1(c), the compu-
tation is realized as the joint evolution of two isolated
quantum servers. In our experiment, Computation-A
and Computation-B can be compiled into the setup in
Fig. 2(b), where the logical qubits |0〉 and |1〉 are en-
coded by horizontal (H) and vertical (V ) polarizations
of single photons, respectively. Instead of implement-
ing the standard CNOT gate between the first and sec-
ond qubits in Computation-A, Charlie can ask Alice
to use a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) to postselect
events where there is exactly one photon exiting each
output (the first two EPR states are transformed into
1/
√
2(|0〉A1 |0〉A2 |0〉B1 |0〉B2 + |1〉A1 |1〉A2 |1〉B1 |1〉B2 ) after postse-
lection, where A (B) represents Alice (Bob).) and mea-
sure these two photons in the Pauli X basis.
If Alice’s reported results yield a1 · a2 = a3 = 1, then
Bob’s share of the EPR states collapse onto the desired
state |φ〉. The CNOT gate in Computation-B can be re-
alized by combining three polarization-dependent beam-
splitters (PDBS) – an overlapping PDBS (TH = 1 and
TV = 1/3), and two supplementary PDBSs (TV = 1 and
TH = 1/3) at each exit port of the overlapping PDBS,
along with two Hadamard gates (half-wave plate (HWP))
on the target photon before and after the PDBS [28].
The different treatment of the CNOT gates arises be-
cause Bob is required to complete the computation and
convey the final outcomes, so he is instructed to imple-
ment the complete Bell measurement. However, Alice
only needs to prepare resource states for Bob. As long
as Alice can prepare the desired states, we deem her to
be honest.
2. CHSH test. Charlie sends random bits A ∈ {0, 1}
and B ∈ {0, 1} to Alice and Bob, respectively, which de-
termines their measurement bases, and they respond with
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FIG. 2. (color online). Experimental setup. (a) Outline of the scheme. Charlie classically interacts with quantum servers Alice
and Bob who share entanglement. Each of the quantum servers is randomly commanded to implement one of the two types of
operations, CHSH and Computation-A(B). (b) Computation setup. Ultraviolet laser pulses with a central wavelength of 394 nm,
pulse duration of 150fs, and repetition rate of 80MHz pass through three BBO crystals to produce three polarization-entangled
pairs 1√
2
(|H〉|V 〉 + |V 〉|H〉). A HWP is placed at an arm of the entangled pairs to produce EPR states 1√
2
(|H〉|H〉+ |V 〉|V 〉).
To achieve good spatial and temporal overlap, all photons are spectrally filtered with 3-nm bandwidth filters. The final
measurement results are then read out by single-photon detectors with dual-channel structure, which partially eliminates
higher-order events. (c) CHSH test setup. (d) State tomography setup. (e) Process tomography setup.
bitsM ∈ {0, 1} and N ∈ {0, 1} corresponding to their bi-
nary measurement outcomes (see Fig. 2(c)). In this test,
Alice and Bob ‘win’ if AB =M ⊕N , and they can win
with probability ω∗ = cos2(pi/8) ≈ 0.854 if Bob measures
in the Pauli Z basis for B = 0 or Pauli X basis for B = 1,
and if Alice measures (Z + (−1)AX)/√2. According to
Alice’s and Bob’s measurement outcomes a and b, i.e.,
± 1, Charlie sets M and N to 0 or 1. In contrast, clas-
sical servers can win with probability at most 3/4. In
our protocol, Charlie can also change the strategy to si-
multaneously swap the measurement bases of Alice and
Bob; that is, Alice measures Z or X , and Bob measures
(Z + (−1)BX)/√2. According to the rigidity of CHSH
test [14], if the servers win with probability close to ω∗,
the implement strategy is close to the ideal strategy. To
ensure servers’ honesty, Charlie runs n rounds of CHSH
tests with both servers, and rejects if the servers fail to
win at least (ω∗ − ε)n rounds, where ε = 1
2
√
2
√
logn/n
is the error threshold [29, 30].
3. State tomography. Charlie asks Alice to implement
Computation-A while running CHSH test with Bob (see
Fig. 2(d)). If Alice honestly implements the command,
Bob’s state collapses to |Φ±〉 ⊗ |β〉. Bob is required to
measure in the bases X1X2Z3 or Z1Z2Z3, where the first
two bases X1X2 and Z1Z2 are the stabilizers for the Bell
states, and Z3 is the stabilizer of |β〉. In these cases,
Bob’s measurement outcomes are deterministic, depend-
ing on Alice’s results. Thus, Charlie can test whether
Alice is honest according Bob’s measurement outcomes.
If Bob reports the wrong stabilizer syndrome in even a
single round, Charlie can reject. If Alice plays honestly,
Charlie accepts with high probability.
4. Process tomography. Charlie asks Bob to imple-
ment Computation-B while running CHSH test with Al-
ice (see Fig. 2(e)). If Bob honestly implements the com-
mand, Alice’s state collapses to |β〉|Ψ〉. Alice is required
to measure in the bases Z1X2X3 or Z1Z2Z3, where the
last two bases, X2X3 and Z2Z3, are the Bell-state sta-
bilizers, and the first basis Z1 is the stabilizer of |β〉.
Therefore, if Alice reports the wrong stabilizer syndrome
in even a single round, Charlie can reject. If Bob plays
honestly, Charlie accepts with high probability.
Charlie runs Protocol 1 with a small probability η , and
other three alternative protocols with probability 1−η
3
so
that servers are not aware of which protocol their mea-
surements belong to. For instance, from Alice’s perspec-
tive, she is entirely unaware whether Bob is implement-
ing CHSH test or Computation-B. From the CHSH test
and stabilizer test, Charlie can determine whether the
servers are being honest or not. The relationship among
η, computational efficiency and security parameters are
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FIG. 3. (color online). Experimental results for honest Alice and Bob. (a) Output of quantum computing for factorizing
N = 15, which is determined by the results of the second photon Bob observed in the subprotocol Computation. Theoretical
predictions and measured expectation values are shown as red and blue bars, respectively. (b) The probability that Alice passes
the tests of state tomography when Bob measures in the X1X2Z3 and Z1Z2Z3 bases. (c) The probability that Bob passes the
tests of process tomography when Alice measures in the Z1X2X3 and Z1Z2Z3 bases.
analyzed in Supplemental Material [30].
To demonstrate the scheme, we employ polarization-
entangled photons |Φ+〉 generated by spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion using a HWP-sandwiched β-
barium borate (BBO) crystal [31]. For Protocol 1, ex-
perimental results are shown in Fig. 3(a). If Alice and
Bob play honestly, then, with probability ∼ 51.9%, the
output is |0〉, corresponding to a failure. The remain-
ing ∼ 48.1% probability yields |1〉. Combining these
with the known state of the redundant qubit |0〉R1 us-
ing classical processing yields the period r = 2. Thus,
GCD(112/2 ± 1, 15) = 3, 5, yielding a successful factor-
ization. To quantify the performance of the CNOT oper-
ations realized by the PDBS, we measure process fidelity
[32] for the CNOT gate as 0.87(2) ≤ Fprocess ≤ 0.93(2)
(see Supplemental Material [30] for details).
In our experiment, we run n = 6000 rounds of
CHSH tests, then the error threshold is calculated as
ε = 1
2
√
2
√
logn/n = 0.014. Two honest quantum servers
win with the probability ∼0.846(6), from which ε is cal-
culated as ε =0.007(6) – below the error threshold. Thus,
Charlie accepts the protocol (see Supplemental Material
[30] for more detailed security analysis). On the other
hand, if the quantum servers play dishonestly, for exam-
ple, making the angle of the HWP in Bob’s measurement
set-up always 5◦ higher than the target angle, they win
with probability ∼0.814(5) and thus ε =0.047(5), which
is above the threshold, and Charlie rejects.
Protocol 3 is designed to monitor whether Alice hon-
estly executes Computation-A. If Alice plays honestly,
Bob’s measurement outcomes are deterministic, depend-
ing on Alice’s results. Figure 3(b) shows the theoreti-
cal and experimental results. The probability that Al-
ice passes the tests are 0.92(2) and 0.94(2) when Bob
measures in the X1X2Z3 and Z1Z2Z3 bases (see Supple-
mental Material [30] for details), respectively. To illus-
trate that the method can detect whether Alice is cheat-
ing, we consider two typical potential means of cheat-
ing: (1) If Alice deliberately reports the opposite out-
comes of the first qubit, and the reported results yield
a1 · a2 = 1(−1), Bob’s share of the EPR state collapses
into |Φ−〉|0〉 (|Φ+〉|0〉) instead of into |Φ+〉|0〉 (|Φ−〉|0〉) so
the probability of passing the tests (see Fig. 4(a)) drops
to 0.06(2) when Bob measures in the X1X2Z3 basis and
remains at 0.91(2) in the Z1Z2Z3 basis; (2) If Alice’s third
measurement basis is X3 instead of Z3, the probability of
passing the tests for X1X2Z3 and Z1Z2Z3 measurements
are 0.47(4) and 0.49(4) (Fig. 4(b)), respectively. Obvi-
ously, Charlie can easily identify that Alice is dishonest
based on Bob’s reported results.
Protocol 4 monitors whether Bob honestly executes
Computation-B. If Bob plays honestly, Alice’s measure-
ment outcomes are deterministic, depending on Bob’s re-
sults. Figure 3(c) shows the theoretical and experimen-
tal results. The probability that Bob passes the tests are
0.87(2) and 0.86(2) when Alice measures in the Z1X2X3
and Z1Z2Z3 bases (see Supplemental Material [30] for
details), respectively. To demonstrate that the method
detects whether Bob is cheating, we consider two possible
circumstances: (1) If Bob measures the last two qubits in
the Z2Z3 basis instead of the X2Z3 basis, the probability
of passing the tests (Fig. 4(c)) drops to 0.52(4) when Al-
ice measures in the Z1X2X3 basis and remains at 0.89(3)
in the Z1Z2Z3 basis. (2). If Bob’s first measurement ba-
sis is Z1 instead ofX1, the probability of passing Z1X2X3
and Z1Z2Z3 tests are 0.41(4) and 0.47(3) (Fig. 4(d)), re-
spectively. Thus, Bob’s cheating can easily be caught.
This scheme is device-independent, in that it mitigates
the need for clients to place trust in any pre-existing de-
vice. The scheme is theoretically efficient, in the sense
that its number of rounds scales with circuit size n,
O(nc), where c is a constant [11, 14]. Subsequent re-
sults indicate the number of rounds can be reduced if we
require only one-sided device-independence [15].
In summary, we experimentally demonstrate secure
computation on quantum cloud servers using a photonic
setup where 3 EPR states are shared between two quan-
tum servers. In our implementation, the correctness of
results can be tested through verification protocols, based
on the rigidity of CHSH test and stabilizer tests. Our ex-
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FIG. 4. (color online). Experimental result for dishonest
Alice and Bob. (a) Probability that Alice passes the tests
of state tomography when Bob measures in X1X2Z3 and
Z1Z2Z3 bases, if Alice deliberately reports the opposite re-
sults for the first qubit. (b) Probability that Alice passes the
tests of state tomography when Bob measures in X1X2Z3 and
Z1Z2Z3 bases, if Alice’s third measurement basis isX3 instead
of Z3. (c) Probability that Bob passes the tests of process
tomography when Alice measures in Z1X2X3 and Z1Z2Z3
bases, if Bob measures the last two qubits in Z2Z3 instead
of the X2Z3 basis. (d) Probability that Bob passes the tests
of process tomography when Alice measures in Z1X2X3 and
Z1Z2Z3 bases, if Bob’s first measurement basis is Z1 instead
of X1.
periment introduces the features of multiple servers, de-
vice independence, and, especially, a completely classical
client, leading to a heuristic exploration for future secure
distributed quantum networks ‘in the cloud’. This type
of encryption will be crucial to enable scalable models
for secure, outsourced quantum computation to emerge,
paving the way for the commercialization and widespread
adoption of quantum computer technology.
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